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ARTICLES
THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY: A
QUALITATIVE INQUIRY
Reginald Ezetah*
It is widely accepted that the end of the Cold War provid-
ed an opportunity for a new paradigm in the global search for
peace and security. An examination of the old and persisting
statist paradigm-which consists, at least partially, of mass
murder by governments-belies the common assumption that
most states possess a unity of identity, population, govern-
ment, and territory. This assumption constitutes the moral and
logical underpinnings of the statist model. However, new im-
peratives of justice, human rights, and self-determination have
challenged the coercive order of the statist paradigm. Contrary
to the statist model, it is becoming clear that enduring peace
can be found only in order rooted in justice and human devel-
opment, that is, in a democratic peace. However, the meaning
of "democracy," especially as expounded in scholarly literature
and state practice, remains a riddle of immense proportions.
Given the asymmetries that surround the notion and prac-
tice of democracy, the implanting of a democratic culture or the
fortification of existing democratic ethos is an all-important
project. We cannot afford to leave this to the fortunes of a slow
and uncertain voyage of domestic political change. A firm and
decisive measure is called for now-a positive, multilateral
revaluation of the concept, process, and practice of democra-
cy-with the primary purpose of restoring sovereignty to the
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people.
Conceptually, democracy must be accepted as a context-
dependent idea that has a core, unalterable, universal stan-
dard. It should be redefined as an instrument of human devel-
opment in order to give the incentive to civil society for pulling
together behind democracy. Put in simple terms, there has to
be a material stake for the ordinary man on the street in the
survival of democracy. Totalitarianism is often effective in a
disenchanted, indifferent, or weak civil society, one that fails to
demand accountability. Through a grudging withdrawal, such
a society passively encourages the totalitarian state. The guar-
antee of welfare rights could be cultivated as a rallying point of
democratic solidarity for the masses of civil society.
The tensions inherent in pluralism are not necessarily
accommodated by the majoritarian ethic of democracy, which
runs through all spheres of participation. Therefore, it is time
to go beyond the "participatory" index of international instru-
ments and reconciliatory devices of domestic institutions, and
to internationally criminalize political oppression of minorities
and the official looting of public resources. This is one way of
ensuring that democratic institutions and devices for reconcil-
ing competing claims that flow from diversity are not under-
mined by corrupt leadership. It is yet another way of reassur-
ing minorities and the voiceless, and of building a consensus of
democratic commitment in lieu of a consensus of opinion.
Legitimacy of any administration is a function of the ag-
gregate perception of the majority of the populace, and the
process by which this popular will is expressed is of central
importance to democracy. Therefore, elections-used in this
context in a broad sense to include any systemic expression of
popular mandate accepted and affordable by a people, but
which ensures free and fair contest--could be further legiti-
mized by ,the participation of a neutral, disinterested observer.
This external participation should be multilateral and all-em-
bracing, such that the sovereignty of all states and nations are
equally affected and none is relatively disadvantaged.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of the United Nations Organization
(U.N.) as set out in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter (the Charter)
496 [Vol. XXI:3
RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY
is the maintenance of international peace and security.' Peace
and security have maintained a prominent position in interna-
tional relations since at least 1795, when Immanuel Kant pro-
posed an international treaty on "Perpetual Peace" based on a
guarantee of human rights in domestic laws.2 Since Kant, the
inter-connectedness of peace, security, human rights, and de-
mocracy has become axiomatic.3 This has been matched with
revolutionary laws, such as the Uniting for Peace Resolution of
1950 (giving the General Assembly extraordinary powers of
intervention in the interest of international peace in the event
of a deadlock at the Security Council),4 and of more recent
origin, an emergent norm of humanitarian intervention for the
restoration of democracy. Since the inception of the Peace Res-
olution, activities of the United Nations have demonstrated
that the Charter, through its focus on peace and security, pres-
ents a flexible instrument that could justify corrective mea-
sures to preserve democracy as long as those measures take
place within a structured framework.5 It is on this prem-
ise-in light of the international legal regime's reformation
crisis-that this article is based.
Despite the near-global consensus on the right to democra-
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1).
2. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in POLITICAL
WRITINGS 93 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed.
1991) (1795).
3. See, e.g., Brian Urquhart, The UN and International Security After the
Cold War, in UNITED NATIONS, DIWDED WORLD 81, 97 (Adam Roberts & Benedict
Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993) ("The spread of democracy, and respect for human
rights, are indispensable elements of a more stable, less violent human society,
and are, as such, a legitimate-indeed an indispensable-international concern");
BOUTROS BOuTROS-GHALi, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE at 39, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-
S/24111, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.15 (2d ed. 1995), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLD, supra, at 468; Interrelationship Between Human Rights and Inter-
national Peace: Report of the Secretary.General, U.N. ESCOR, 40th Sess., Provision-
al Agenda Item 4, at 4, 1 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.211988/2 (1988) (discussing the
United Nation's recognition of a "complex interrelationship between... human
rights and fundamental freedoms .... peace and security, and... economic,
social and cultural development"); Alma Ata Declaration, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
Annex U, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/60-S/23329 (1991).
4. G.A. Res. 377A, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, 302d plen. mtg. at
10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); see Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian
Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 331 (1996).
5. See, e.g., GA- Res. 1474, U.N. GAOR, 4th Emergency Special Sess., Supp.
No. 1, 863d plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/4510 (1960) (requesting voluntary con-
tributions and an arms embargo to restore peace in the Republic of the Congo).
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cy, there remains a dearth of scholarly qualitative examination
of the new international norm. This article, with the ultimate
objective of unraveling all the contents of the right to democra-
cy, will examine the liberal concept of democracy in the context
of state practice. Part I of this article will demonstrate that
liberal democracy, as we now know it, is not a universal phe-
nomenon and is not the universal democracy envisioned when
one speaks of "the right to democracy." Part H will further
argue that because of philosophies stemming from internation-
al law and state practice, universal democracy must be based
on a foundation of social welfare. Part III of the article will
argue that the right to a democratic system of government
should be considered a peremptory norm in international law.
Part IV will describe the substantive, procedural, and structur-
al content of the right to democracy. Part V will demonstrate
that democracy suffers from an inherent weakness in its uni-
versal manifestation, and needs, therefore, to be reinforced
through a convention. Finally, this paper proposes enhancing
democracy by reinforcing demokratia, or "rule by the people,"
by means of a Convention on Democratic Governance, a pro-
posed model of which is delineated in the Appendix.
II. THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY
A. Liberal Democracy
"Democracy" was coined from the Greek word dimokratia
meaning "rule by the people."6 Its philosophical underpinnings
lie in the theories of the social contractarians, particularly in
John Locke's theory of Civil Government,7 which is founded on
an initial presupposition of equality of all people.8 These theo-
ries are the foundation of liberal democracy, which is identified
as a western idea, and the main features of which are individ-
ual freedom and political equality.' The modern institutional
6. See Geraint Parry & George Moyser, More Participation, More Democracy?,
in DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY 44, 44 (David Beetham ed., 1994).
7. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 137 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
8. See id. at 269.
9. See Michael Saward, Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization, in
DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 6, 16-17; David Beetham,
Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit, in DEFINING AND MEASURING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 25, 28.
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framework of liberal democracy is based on the doctrines of
separation of powers' and free market economy." So au-
thentic and influential has this "western idea" become that
modern-day scholars describe the new norm of a right to de-
mocracy as the universal legitimization of a "western idea."1
Historically, liberal democratic theory has withstood a
barrage of criticism. Its presumption of equality has been de-
scribed as romantic nonsense," and its individualism has
been criticized for divesting the individual of his personality by
divorcing him from his ontological bearings.' According to the
critics of liberal democracy, the consequent emptiness 5 has
observable political results, namely, a disorganized and frag-
mented public sphere. 6 Thus, according to its critics, liberal
democracy is, by and large, undemocratic, and its conceptual
pillars of "popular sovereignty" and "legitimate governance" are
10. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-62 (Franz
Neumann ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748).
11. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 270-74 (1971).
12. See Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal
Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 289, 290
(1995); see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INTL L. 46, 49 (1992).
13. See generally Lee Kuan Yew, Democracy and Human Rights for the World,
20 MEDIA ASIA 33 (1993). Yew draws an instructive analogy between the specious
assumption that all humans are equal and the principle of "one nation, one vote"
in the U.N. General Assembly. While the General Assembly organ of the United
Nations appears equal, its resolutions do not carry the force of sanctions. True
power in the U.N. is reserved for the permanent members of the Security Council.
See id. at 38.
14. See Victor Segesvary, Group Rights: The Definition of Group Rights in the
Contemporary Legal Debate Based on Soco-Cultural Analysis, 3 INT'L J. ON GROUP
RTS. 89, 93 (1995). In this brilliant paper, the author demonstrates that the indi-
vidual and his community are ontologically interdependent; i.e., the life and des-
tiny of the individual and his community are inextricably intertwined. See id.; see
also ERWIN SCHRODINGER, MY VIEW OF THE WORLD 54 (Cecily Hastings trans., Ox
Bow Press 1983) (1961); CAROL GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND
SOCIAL COOPERATION IN POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 93-94 (1988).
15. See John Gelding, Two Who Made a Revolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May
31, 1990, at 8 (offering the paintings of synthetic cubist Georges Braque as exam-
ples of objective detachment devoid of meaning). Here the consequence of isola-
tionism is a meaningless existence depicted by Braque's mood toward the end of
his life: "I no longer believe in anything. Objects don't exist for me except insofar
as a rapport exists between them and myself." Id.
16. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 142 (Thomas Bur-
ger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1989); David Held, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL
THEORY 223-59 (1980).
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no more than fraudulent myths. 7
The observable contradiction inherent in liberal theory and
liberal practice 8 has undermined the liberal democratic sys-
tem. The conceptual and practical problems of liberal theory
are further entrenched by its laissez-faire economy, whose
manifest aim of individual consumerism 9 combines with the
isolationism of liberal theory to create a type of nominalism.
As a result, "human dignity" and "subjective freedom" become
mere by-products of a complex process of material relations."
The reality of the foregoing is lost neither on the liberal
politician2  nor on the liberal scholar.22 Indeed, contemporary
definitions of democracy by liberal scholars manifest a tenden-
cy to look beyond empirical liberal structures, and toward
liberal idealism.'
Liberal democratic theory has not survived this onslaught
17. See Yew, supra note 13, at 38.
18. Egalitarianism is the silver thread that runs throughout the bounds and
fabric of the theories of social contractarians, and this can hardly be reconciled
with the liberal philosophy of equality. For example, Hobbes' Leviathan was om-
nipotent, a mortal god having monopoly over all political wisdom. THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1651).
19. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 273-74.
20. The intractability of the dilemma posed by liberalism in the laissez-faire
context is analogous to the scholastic debates over God's will, in which some phi-
losophers argue that God is not free if His decisions are motivated by His knowl-
edge, if that is independent of His will. Others counter that God is not wise if He
goes against His better judgment. See Nikolai Biryukov & Victor Sergeyev, The
Idea of Democracy in the West and in the East, in DEFINING AND MEASURING DE-
MOCRACY, supra note 6, at 182, 189.
21. In recognition of the foregoing, the United States in 1975 established a
trilateral commission to reexamine the concept and practice of liberal democracy.
See PHILIP K. LAWRENCE, DEMOCRACY AND THE LIBERAL STATE 2 (1989).
22. Liberal scholars are beginning to acknowledge the tension between liberal
individualism and the notion of society. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBER-
ALISM 190 (1993) (observing that while "[hlistorically one common theme of liberal
thought is that the state must not favor any comprehensive doctrines and their
associated conception of the good[,] . . . it is equally a common theme of critics of
liberalism that it fails to do this and is, in fact, arbitrarily biased in favor of one
or another form of individualism."). See generally RAWLS, supra note 11. Rawls,
ostensibly battling with the fragmentary consequences of liberalism and the self
consumerism of the free market economy, advocates social cooperation for the
happiness of the "greatest number." In doing this, he undertakes the very difficult
task of synthesizing seemingly conflicting concepts such as "liberty and equality,"
"individual self interest and toleration," and "social justice and free market capital-
ism." He ends up with an idealistic "well-ordered society" comprised of reasonable
people. See id. at 453-62.
23. See, e.g., SAMUEL BRITAN, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOCRACY
274-77 (1977).
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unscathed. Policies of social security, social welfare, and medi-
cal insurance are material evidence of a reversing trend, and
ostensibly constitute a search for the social bonds that were
undermined by laissez-faire liberalism. The capacity of these
policies to uproot liberal theory's isolatory features remains to
be seen.
However, the allure of certain aspects of liberal democracy
has remained pervasive, such that some scholars hold the view
that "[tihe liberal interpretation is not wrong. It just does not
see the beam in its own eye."' While the liberal political for-
mula offers a good doctrinal basis for fostering individual
choice, liberty, and private property, its indisputable handicaps
are its negation of social solidarity and its inability to provide
the identity and meaning that are essential to the dignity and
personality of the individual. The laissez-faire environment of
liberal democracy is a perfect setting for eroding the public's
freedom of opinion. Indeed, observable trends in liberal elector-
al processes point to a growing apathy, with less than fifty
percent of eligible voters participating in the 1996 presidential
elections in the United States.' As a necessary foundation for
individual self-accomplishment, liberal free market democracy
protects the privilege of a few at the expense of the majority
24. Jiirgen Habermas, What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Revolutions of
Recuperation and the Need for New Thinking, in AFTER THE FALL: THE FAILURE
OF COMMUNISM AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM 25, 31 (Robin Blackburn ed., Ben
Morgan trans., 1991). Vclav Havel construes liberal democracy's inability to gain
universal acceptance as a consequence of its formulation as a pious doctrine, com-
plete and unalterable, and its failure to come to terms with the harsh reality of a
diverse and multicultural world. According to Havel, "[D]emocracy in its present
Western form arouses skepticism and mistrust in many parts of the world." Vdclav
Havel, Democracy's Forgotten Dimension, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1995). Havel
concludes:
The effective expansion of democracy therefore presupposes a criti-
cal self-examination, a process that will lead to its internalization.
.. . This internalization of democracy today can scarcely take the
form of some doctrine, that is, a collection of dogmas and rituals. This
probably would have exactly the opposite effect: To all the mutually dis-
trustful cultural currents there would only be added others, ones that
would be very artificial because they would not have grown out of the
nourishing soil of myth-making eras. If a renaissance of spirituality does
occur, it will far more likely be a multi-leveled and multi-cultural reflec-
tion, with a new political ethos ....
Id. at 12.
25. See R.W. Apple, Jr., A Divided Government Remains, and with It the Pros-
pect of Further Combat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B6.
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and in the face of widespread misery. Such a situation leaves
much to be desired.
B. Relativity of Democracy In Practice
Democracy is a social theory, and thus has defied a univer-
sally accepted definition.2 1 The appeal of its cardinal maxims,
freedom and equality,
makes it susceptible in different cultures and societies to its
acceptance by degrees.
Thus, in the biggest democracy of the world, India, the
equality of people is thwarted by an extensive caste system
and by religious divisions. In... the United States of Ameri-
ca, the two top executives, the President and the Vice-Presi-
dent, are still elected by electoral colleges, not by popular
vote.'
Further, in Asia, the Japanese model, which is widely en-
dorsed as one of the most successful liberal democracies, has in
fact retained the ideals of Confucianism, which dictate primacy
of group interest as opposed to the individualism of liberal
democracy, and this ideal has informed judicial attitude.28
The new Russian democratic system simply classifies as "dissi-
dent" individual or minority dissent; thus, the people as indi-
viduals do not in reality exercise such independent franchise
as liberalism would contemplateY.2  While some pre-colonial
African societies were essentially democratic, as demonstrated
26. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (1956).
27. Filipe N. Bole, Fiji's Chiefly System and its Pattern of Political Self-Reli-
ance, in CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 67, 69 (Ron Crocombe et
al. eds., 1992). It is, however, important to note that in the recent history of U.S.
democracy, the electoral college has in substance been a deadletter of the Consti-
tution, as popular vote has been the decider of political contests for the presiden-
cy. Still, it is by no means insignificant that the non-populist and feudalistic phi-
losophy of the electoral college has persisted as a constitutional principle in the
world's foremost liberal democracy, and should the occasion arise, it would be the
legal means for "electing" the president.
28. See Dean J. Gibbons, Law and the Group Ethos in Japan, 3 INT'L LEGAL
PERSP. 98, 108-09 (1990). The normative traditional saying in Japan is: "Deru kugi
wa uteru," which means, 'The nail that sticks up gets hammered down." Rajendra
Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan: A Story of New Wine in Old
Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INTIL L. REv. 127, 131 (1994).
29. See Nikolai Biryukov & Victor Sergeyev, The Idea of Democracy in the
West and in the East, in DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at
182, 194-95.
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by the widely applied principle of public involvement in deci-
sion making,30 post-colonial Africa attempted a wholesale
adoption of liberal democratic systems without deference to
cultural values. The most prominent models were the West-
minster majoritarian model and the centralized executive mod-
el of Fifth Republic France. These models did not guarantee
proportional representation, and thus accentuated the diversity
inherent in the arbitrary colonial boundaries of Africa. Conse-
quently, in contemporary Africa it is better to talk about "dem-
ocratic impulses" than liberal democratic systems.3 '
So far, one may conclude that states' practice shows that
the meaning of democracy is enriched by the culture in which
it is examined. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence that
state practice does not endorse any particular political model
as a universal democracy, nor has any one political model
obtained legal status. In the U.N. forum, for example, coun-
tries whose systems hardly resemble liberal democracy but
whose constitutions describe them as democratic, are never-
theless addressed as democracies, as is evinced by the use of
terms such as "Republic," "Democratic Republic," "People,"
"Commonwealth," and "Federation" in U.N. instruments. How-
ever, it must be emphasized that the absence of a universal
political model does not negate universal democracy.
IH. THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY
A. The Peremptory Norm of Self-Determination
The norm of self-determination guarantees the right of a
people or a nation freely to determine, without any outside
interference, its political and legal status as a separate entity.
Preferably, such self-determination will be effected through
formation of an independent state; in addition, the people
should have the right to choose their form of government, and
their economic, social, and cultural systems. 2 So conceived,
30. See RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS OF
TROPICAL AFRICA 13-14 (1984). A good example of pre-colonial democracy is the Ibo
traditional society in Nigeria, depicted in CHINUA ACHEBE, THINGS FALL APART
(Ballantine Books 1983) (1959).
31. See Naomi Chazan, Democratic Fragments: Africa's Quest for Democracy, in
4 DEMOCRACY AND MODERNITY 111, 112 (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1992).
32. See Frank Przetacznik, The Basic Collective Human Right to Self-Determi-
nation of Peoples and Nations as a Prerequisite for Peace: Its Philosophical Back-
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self-determination is Janus-faced: On the one hand, it means
political independence from alien domination or an already
existing sovereign state, while on the other hand, it entails a
people's democratic choice about its governance. 33 Self-deter-
mination has peremptory normative status (]us cogens) in in-
ternational law' and can be set aside only by a subsequent
peremptory norm of contrary effect.3 Therefore, the right to
democracy as an internal aspect of the right to self-determina-
tion of "all peoples" 6 and nations can properly be classified as
an overriding customary international law.3" Because the na-
tionalist aspect of self-determination dominated the bipolar
Cold War period as a result of the politically and ideologically
sensitive question of colonies and non-self-governing territo-
ries,38 the notion of internal self-determination as customary
international law has suffered in obscurity.
ground and Practical Application, 69 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCES
DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLITIQUES 259, 263 (1991).
33. See Jane E. Stromseth, Self-Determination, Secession and Humanitarian
Intervention by the United Nations, 86 AM. SOC'Y OF INTL L. PROC. 370, 370
(1992). Thomas Franck has defined the right of self-determination as the right of
"a people organized in an established territory to determine its collective political
destiny in a democratic fashion ... ." Franck, supra note 12, at 52.
34. See HICTOR GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLE-
MENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS at 11, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XIV.5 (1980) (study prepared by
Hdctor Gros Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (4th ed. 1990). Quite recently, the International Court of
Justice has reaffirmed the erga omnes character of the right to self-determination
as "irreproachable" in the case of East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 120
(June 30), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1583, 1589.
35. See BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 515.
36. Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, GA.
Res. 93, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 108(a), at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/48/93 (1994); Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: Report of the
Third Committee, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 108(a), at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/48/626 (1993); see 1993 U.N.Y.B. 871, U.N. Sales No. E.94.I.1.
37. See Jean Salmon, Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination, in
MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION: TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY PRIN-
CIPLE? 253, 277 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
38. See Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Deter-
mination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION: TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY PRINCIPLE?, supra note 37, at 101, 120.
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B. The Right to Democracy
The issue of a right to democracy has been extensively
commented on by scholars, especially some of "the most highly
qualified [western] publicists," 9 and there is a near consensus
among these publicists on the existence of a right to democra-
cy, as well as on the legitimacy of collective intervention for
the restoration of democracy.4° Though their thesis is of
doubtful validity, Michael Reisman and Lois Fielding have
gone further by endorsing unilateral intervention for the pro-
tection of democracy.41 Whereas unilateralism is illegal under
the terms of article 2 of the Charter,42 and is contrary to the
normative principle of collective security on which the U.N.
system is founded,43 scholars recognize that there is an inter-
39. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d),
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187 (in making judicial determinations, the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) shall apply, inter alia, "the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists").
40. See Franck, supra note 12, at 90-91; Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Politi-
cal Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INTL L. 539, 552-70 (1992);
Gregory H. Fox, National Sovereignty Revisited. Perspectives on the Emerging Norm
of Democracy in International Law, in 86TH PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEET-
ING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1992); JAMES
CRAWFORD, DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-7 (1994); Babacar Ndiaye, Inter-
national Co-operation to Promote Democracy and Human Rights: Principles and
Programmes, INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, Dec. 1992, at 23; Oscar Schachter, The
Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984); Michael W.
Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1151, 1162 (1986);
Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights:
The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J.
COmE. & INTIL L. 329, 332-38, 343-55 (1995).
41. W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democra-
cies, 18 FORDHAM INTL L. J. 794, 804-05 (1995); Fielding, supra note 40, at 343.
The International Court of Justice in the 1966 South West Africa cases decided
that not even compelling grounds of necessity could justify an actio popularis in
international law. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Ar.), 1966 I.C.J.
6, 47, para. 88 (July 18) (rejecting necessity argument as based on "extra-legal"
considerations and concluding that although "an actio popularis, or right resident
in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a public in-
terestr is recognized in some municipal legal systems, it is not a general principle
of international law). This decision was a judicial indictment of unilateralism in
the multilateral context of the United Nations system.
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
43. See Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Prece-
dent for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 341, 357 (1995). According to
Falk, it is imperative to be cautious in seeking further expansion of the frontiers
of humanitarian intervention in a system where selective and discriminatory appli-
cation of international law has become the rule. Id. at 345 n.23.
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national right to democracy that could be protected by collec-
tive intervention. Moreover, global and regional human rights
instruments also have endorsed the right to democracy."
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration) is the premier instrument on the right to democ-
racy, and it contains the clearest statement on the issue of
democracy.46 While General Assembly resolutions are often
regarded as not binding,47 it must be noted that the Universal
44. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, art. 25, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23, 30-31 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). Article 25 of the covenant provides that "every
citizen shall have the right and the opportunity... without unreasonable restric-
tions . . . to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors." Id. art. 25(b); see also Protocol to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 264 (entered into force May 18,
1954) (acknowledging obligation of parties to "hold free elections . . . under condi-
tions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature"); American Convention on Human Rights, done Nov. 22,
1969, preamble, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 144 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (reaf-
firming commitment of parties to protecting rights "within the framework of demo-
cratic institutions"); id. art. 23, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 151 (guaranteeing the right to
participate in public affairs, vote, and to have access to public service); id. art. 29,
1144 U.N.T.S. at 153 (disavowing interpretations of the convention that would
preclude other rights and guarantees "derived from representative democracy as a
form of government"); Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted
June 27, 1981, art. 13, 21 I.L.M. 58, 61 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meet-
ing of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, art. 3, 29 I.L.M.
1305 (expressing agreement of participating states that "democracy is an element
of the rule of law"); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(c), 660 U.N.T.S.
195, 220 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, done Mar. 31, 1953, arts. I-IH, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 1911, 193 U.N.T.S. 135,
136-38; U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1), 55-56.
45. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
46. Id. art. 21.
47. The conclusion that the resolutions are mere recommendations is based on
narrow logic. If the fundamental principles of the United Nations are collectivism
and sovereign equality, then one must concede at least that resolutions carry the
moral force of the opinions of most sovereign states. Then again, there is no clear-
cut distinction between morality and legality, both are overarching, mutually com-
plementing.
The General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377A, supra
note 4, demonstrated the residual legal capacity of the General Assembly. See
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
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Declaration is not just another General Assembly Resolution.
It has become an edifying referent for state constitutions,
whose contents sometimes are a wholesale adoption of provi-
sions of the Universal Declaration. Beyond state boundaries,
the Universal Declaration has inspired regional and interna-
tional agreements.4" The Universal Declaration has effectively
shed whatever stigma attended the circumstances of its birth
because, according to the United Nations, the broadest legally
binding human rights agreements-the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights49 and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights°--have "take[n]
the provisions of the Universal Declaration a step further by
making them binding upon States parties."5' Additionally, the
universal acceptance of the Universal Declaration constitutes
an opinio juris sufficient for a binding customary rule of in-
ternational law. It is in this light that the Universal Decla-
ration is seen as having "evolved into the Magna Carta of the
international human rights movement and the premier norma-
tive international instrument on the subject."52
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 45-50 (June 21) (rendering opinion that General Assembly
did not act beyond its powers in adopting resolution 2145, which terminated the
Mandate for South Africa). See also Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
I.C.J. 151, 163 (July 20), in which the I.C.J. held that the powers and responsibili-
ties under article 24 of the Charter were only primarily those of the Security
Council and were never intended to be exclusively vested in the Security Council;
thus, article 24 did not exclude the General Assembly from assuming similar re-
sponsibilities.
In any event, there can be no better evidence of a general practice accepted
as law than the resolutions of states reached in the most widely representative
and democratic organ of the United Nations, and in the course of discussing issues
under the Charter, which, juridically, is the constitution of the United Nations.
48. See Egon Schwelb & Philip Alston, The Principal Institutions and Other
Bodies Founded Under the Charter, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DvIENSIONS OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS 231, 245 (Karel Vasak & Philip Alston eds., 1982).
49. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
50. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 44, S.
EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171.
51. See THE UNITED NATIONS AT 50: NOTES FOR SPEAKERS 52 (1995).
52. Thomas Buergenthal, The Human Rights Revolution, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 3,
7 (1991); see also Philip Aston, The UN's Human Rights Record: From San Fran-
cisco to Vienna and Beyond, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 375, 376 (1994).
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C. The Duty of Intervention
The right to a democratic governance is clearly borne out
by article 21 of the Universal Declaration.5 3 However, respon-
sibility of States still must be determined. It is pertinent to
note from the outset that "the traditional rule [is] that a State
is not guilty of a breach of international law for injuring one of
its own nationals."54 By logical extension, a State that denies
its citizens the right to democracy is protected from interna-
tional scrutiny. The founders of the United Nations did at-
tempt to entrench and widen this traditional sanctity of inter-
nal matters by substituting article 15, paragraph 8 of the
League of Nations Covenant-which provided for non-interfer-
ence in matters that according to international law are within
the domestic jurisdictional sphere5 -- with article 2(7) of the
Charter. Article 2(7) did not, on its own, leave the scope of
internal matters to be determined by international law, but
instead opted for the vague and expansive phrase "essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction."56 However, contemporary
practice shows that international law has moved beyond this
traditional constraint, and there are now several grounds for
justifying multilateral protection of democracy. For example,
where a denial of democracy is effected by violent repression,
state practice indicates that there is a right of intervention
based on humanitarian imperatives and the right to self-de-
fense of the people.57 United States intervention in Haiti
stands out as a prominent example. 8
Pursuant to international agreements, i.e., articles 55 and
53. Article 21 reads in full:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of gov-
ernment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elec-
tions which shall be by universal and equal suffirage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21.
54. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
192 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Jessup).
55. LEAGuE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 8.
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
57. See Fielding, supra note 40, at 355-69.
58. See id. at 363-65.
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56 of the Charter59 and article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 0 all states parties have a legal interest and a
duty to ensure the protection of human rights and the right to
self-determination within the boundaries of member states.6'
This interest, which would be useless without a remedy, could
legitimize a multilateral measure.
Given that the right to democracy is an aspect of the pe-
remptory norm of self-determination, 62 all states have a posi-
tive obligation erga omnes' (i.e., opposable to, 'and valid
against, the whole world and all legal persons irrespective of
consent) to protect the democratic character of member
states." The legality of a Chapter VII-type measure65 for the
protection of democracy may be justified under the positive
obligation erga omnes of all states in international customary
law to protect the internal self-determination of states. The
normative status of this peremptory norm is now unquestion-
able, such that the usually passive International Court of Jus-
tice has, in one case, indicated its readiness to subsume the
Charter or powers exercised under it to peremptory norms.66
If, however, the measure must be forced into the pronounce-
ments of Chapter VII, then the "domestic jurisdiction" 7 and
"threat" to "international peace"8 limitations in the Charter
would be abridged by the overriding responsibility placed on
states to protect democracy by the peremptory norm of self-
59. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56.
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 44, art. 1,
S. ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
61. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 6,
425-33 (Dec. 21) (separate opinion of Judge Jessup); see also High Commissioner
for the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, G.4_ Res. 141, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 114(b), % 3(a)-(b), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/481141 (1994).
62. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
3, 304 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun).
63. See id& at 32. The court in Barcelona Traction comments on obligations
erga omnes: "1A]i states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection."
Id.
64. See South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J. at 425, 428-29 (separate opinion of
Judge Jessup).
65. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
66. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 436-41 (Sept. 13)
(separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
68. Id. art. 39.
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determination.
The legality of an intervention may be sought in article 24
of the Charter, which has been interpreted as vesting general
powers beyond the specific powers of Chapters VI, VII, VIII,
and XII of the Charter.69 However, there are limits on mea-
sures taken under Chapter V, article 24 inclusive. First, these
limits dictate that the U.N. Security Council act in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the Charter;70 these pur-
poses can validly be summarized as "humanism," and the prin-
ciples of "collectivism." In other words, whatever action the
Security Council takes must be informed by the overriding
interest of the people of the target state. Second, intervention
must be multilateral or collectively sanctioned under the aegis
of the United Nations. Finally, the intervention must not vio-
late the undefined domestic jurisdiction clause, which is per-
missible only when intervention is effected pursuant to Chap-
ter VII.71
Since the end of the Cold War, state practice appears to
have endorsed the principles of the rejected League of Nations
Covenant, article 15, as the cornerstone of domestic jurisdic-
tion; that is, what constitutes "internal matters" is increasingly
an international law determination. 7" For example, it is no
longer debatable that human rights issues are merely an item
of domestic jurisdiction. In the same vein, the legitimacy of
certain governments has acquired international relevancy.
Given that they set a standard for legitimacy of government
and internal sovereignty as the will of the people, international
legal instruments73 should be interpreted as validating inter-
national regulation and protection of that standard.74 In addi-
69. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 52-54 (June 21).
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 24(2).
71. See id. arts. 39, 48, 51.
72. Article 15 reads in pertinent part:
If [a] dispute between .. . parties is claimed by one of them, and is
found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law
is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall
so report and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 8 (emphasis added).
73. Particularly the Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21, and the
U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56.
74. Former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar once observed that "[if
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tion, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations 75-- which is widely accepted as cus-
tomary international law76-expressly makes the territorial
integrity of a state contingent on its possession of a consensual
representative government.77 The inescapable conclusion is
that the legitimacy of a state government is no longer merely a
concern of domestic jurisdiction.
D. Evidence of State Practice
While legal scholarship and international legal instru-
ments do endorse the right to democracy, it is also important
to examine the attitude of states in practice. Based on an an-
nual survey in 1992, out of 183 states, six were communist,
twelve were traditional monarchies, and eighteen were mili-
tary regimes.78 The remaining 147 states were either demo-
cratic or in transition to democracy.79 Huntington has charac-
terized this global phenomenon as the third wavie of democratic
expansion.8" In Eastern Europe, the expansion was manifest
in the disintegration of communist Russia, and the fall of the
Berlin Wall.8 Traditional hardliners, such as Hungary, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, and Albania, are fast embracing democra-
the character, aims and standards of internal sovereignty are ... internationally
defined, the external manifestations of sovereignty are similarly regulated." Javier
Perez de Cuellar, Perez de Cuellar Discusses Sovereignty and International Respon-
sibility, INT'L Comi'N JURISTS, Dec. 1991, at 24, 25 (published text of Perez de
Cuellar's November 21, 1991 address to the University of Florence).
75. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 28,
at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
76. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-determination in the United
Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 305 (1994) (citing BROWNLIE, supra note 34,
at 513); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 27) (determining that the adoption of
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
by states parties "affords an indication of their opinio juris as to customary inter-
national law" on the use of force).
77. See GA Res. 2625, supra note 75, princ. 4, para. 2(b), at 124.
78. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFER-
ENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOC-
RACY 2 (1994).
79. See id.
80. Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy's Third Wave, J. DEMOCRACY, Spring
1991, at 12, 12; see also BEIGBEDER, supra note 78, at 2.
81. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 78, at 3.
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cy. 2 Honduras, Argentina, Grenada, Panama, Chile, Nicara-
gua, Haiti, and the Americas are aspirants to the democratic
circle." In Asia-although tyranny still reigns over the people
of Myanmar, formerly Burma--even China, one of the last
bastions of communism, is said to be softening under intense
international pressure." Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and
Mongolia have demonstrated a resolve to join the train of de-
mocracy.8 Nepal and Cambodia have moved towards democ-
racy.' In Africa, the end of the Cold War signalled the death
of totalitarianism.' African peoples have declared their pref-
erence for democracy in the Abuja Declaration of 199189 and
the Dakar Declaration of 1992.' The European Union (EU)
and the Organization of American States (OAS) have adopted
measures that prioritize democratization of new states and the
protection of member states' democratic character. 1
The general embrace of democracy is also manifest in the
operations of the United Nations, an organ that is perhaps the
most credible index of consensus and collective will of states.
82. See id. at 3-4.
83. See id. at 5-6.
84. See id. at 6.
85. It is widely acknowledged that China is one of the fastest liberalizing
market economies today. Underneath this liberalization lies a democratic ethic (at
least of free enterprise) that should soon impact the political structure of China.
While this point is debatable, it is unquestionable that the situation in China is
far different than it has been in the past. A decade ago, no one would have antic-
ipated Chinas warm reception of free enterprise in the 1990s.
86. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 78, at 6.
87. See id. at 6-7.
88. See id. at 7-8.
89. Abuja Declaration on South Africa, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex II,
Prov. Agenda Item 30, at 83-88, U.N. Doc. A/46/390 (1991) (indicating support for
the abolition of apartheid and the institution of non-racial democracy in South
Africa).
90. DakariNgor Declaration on Population, Family and Sustainable Develop-
ment, Recommendation 20, in U.N. DEP'T FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL INFORMATION
AND POLICY ANALYSIS, POPULATION BULLETIN OF THE UNITED NATIONS at 37, 42,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.N/37-38, U.N. Sales No. E.94=111.16 (1994) (recommending
democratization as a priority in the efforts to eliminate the underlying causes of
the worldwide refugee problem); see Africa: Population Conference Sets Ambitious
Targets, Inter Press Serv., Dec. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
91. See Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," U.N. SCOR, Extraordinary EPC Ministe-
rial mtg., Annex II, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/23293 (1992); O.A.S. CHARTER preamble,
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 981, 981.
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The United Nations has endorsed the monitoring of elections
as an important activity by creating an office of Electoral As-
sistance in 1992.92 It has assisted over forty-five states in con-
ducting and financing elections." In 1981, in a radical depar-
ture from its traditional passivism, the Human Rights Com-
mittee decided that Uruguay's military regime, by its curtail-
ment of political freedom, was in violation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.94 Hence, the norma-
tive status of the right to democracy is endorsed by state prac-
tice.
However, it must be restated that there is no evidence of a
universally accepted model; indeed, there is overwhelming
evidence to the contrary.95 The Vienna Conference on Human
Rights and Development expressly considered, and rejected,
the more inclusive definition of democracy of "full participation
of people in all aspects of their lives.""6 As Thomas Franck
has noted, it is unnecessary to project any given model, for
"the term 'democracy', as used in international rights parlance,
is intended to connote the kind of governance which is legiti-
mated by the consent of the governed.... [E]ssential to the
legitimacy of governance is evidence of consent to the process
by which a populace is consulted by its Government."97 The
92. See Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine
Elections, GA Res. 137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 75th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 98,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/137 (1992); Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Periodic and Genuine Elections: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Agenda Item 98(b), U.N. Doc. A/46/609 (1991); Enhancing the Effectiveness of
the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections: Report of the Secretary General,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(b), U.N. Doc. A/47/668 (1991); see also
Tom J. Farer & Felice Gaer, The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Be-
ginning, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD, supra note 3, at 240, 290-91 (dis-
cussing these resolutions).
93. See THE UNiTED NATIONS AT 50: NOTES FOR SPEAKERS, supra note 51, at
70.
94. Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Concerning
Communication No. R.10144), U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, at 153, 17, U.N. Doc. A136/40 (1981).
95. See supra Part III.B.
96. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR World Conf. on
Human Rts., 48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg. at 20, 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24
(Part 1) (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]; see also Susan Marks, Nightmare
and Noble Dream: The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, 53 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 54, 58 (1994).
97. Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional
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position of the United Nations on this issue has been articulat-
ed by the former Secretary-General:
When, like so many others before me, I stress the imperative
of democratization, I do not mean that some states should
imitate others slavishly, nor do I expect them to borrow polit-
ical systems that are alien to them, much less to gratify cer-
tain Western States-in fact, just the opposite. Let us state,
forcefully, that democracy is the private domain of no one. It
can and ought to be assimilated by all cultures. It can take
many forms in order to accommodate local realities more
effectively. Democracy is not a model to copy from certain
states, but a goal to be achieved by all peoples! It is the po-
litical expression of our common heritage ... 
IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY
A. The Substantive Content
Our initial question-"What is Universal Democra-
cy?--still persists. What are the elements constituting the
"common heritage" that in the view of the United Nations
make up the minimum democratic heritage that has "a univer-
sal dimension?" Article 21 of the Universal Declaration empha-
sizes the overriding importance of the will of the people.99
Therefore, a government that is not based on the consent of
the governed is not democratic. In addition, the government
must be substantially representative of all distinct groups in
the country. This is a logical interpretation of the phrase
"[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government" in
article 21 of the Universal Declaration.' In order not to lose
System, 240 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL [R.C.D.I.]
102 (1993-11).
98. Cerna, supra note 12, at 291-92 (quoting former Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, from his address at the opening of the World Conference on Human
Rights in 1993) (emphasis added). There are fundamental experiences shared by
all beings despite geo-cultural diversities. See STANISLAV GROF & HAL ZINA
BENNETr, THE HOLOTROPIC MIND 89-91 (1992).
The universal heritage of democracy should be seen as a sum total of global
rational choice based on the shared human experience of class domination and
exploitation. At the least, it is evident in the near-universal demystification of the
concept of governance, and in a broader sense it manifests in popular calls for
accountability in governments.
99. Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21(3).
100. Id. art. 21(1).
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the essence or undermine the ethics of the concept of represen-
tation, one must check the tendency to presume a representa-
tion in fact from a nominal representation.'' Representation
should be manifest in active participation such that "represen-
tation and participation [are] experienced as part of a continu-
um.""' Article 21 of the Universal Declaration did, in fact,
contemplate a solution to the question of representation by
providing that everyone has the right to take part in govern-
ment;0 3 this provision denotes an active participation beyond
the initial consent usually expressed through free elections.
The United Nations has defined the right to popular participa-
tion as the "judicial and political structures [that] enable all
citizens to participate, freely and actively, in laying the consti-
tutional foundations of the political community, determining
the scope and purpose of the various institutions, choosing
their leaders, and governing the State."'4 It would be frivo-
lous to argue that because a people have voted in a govern-
ment, every segment of the population must be deemed, a
fortiori, to be participating. On the other hand, it is nonsensi-
cal to argue that a particular segment may choose to withdraw
from participation in the government beyond exercising its
voting rights. To be legitimate and democratic in international
law, the emerging government must be based on the consent of
the people and must be participatorily representative of all
national and distinct political groups in the country. One as-
sumption essential to this standard is that zero-sum politick-
ing in international law is undemocratic and illegal. The con-
sent of the governed and true representative quality of the
government are the substantive components of universal de-
mocracy, to which everyone has a right; both components are
necessary to preserve the sanctity and inviolability of a state's
territorial integrity.
101. See WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 12, 285 (1983).
102. Thornberry, supra note 38, at 116.
103. See supra note 53.
104. Study by the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 41st
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 8(c), at 22, 94, U.N. Doc. EICN.411985/10 (1985)
(emphasis added).
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B. The Procedural Content
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration provides for "peri-
odic and genuine elections... by universal and equal suffrage
and... by secret vote" as the only process by which democracy
can be attained.0 5 Government that gains or retains power
by any other process is not democratic and is thus illegitimate
in international law. Traditional monarchies apparently fail
this test notwithstanding their acclaimed populist image. In
short, the legitimacy of a government must be tested periodi-
cally by elections. There is no space for presumptions of con-
sent.
C. The Structural Content
There is a third element-the structural element-which
makes it mandatory for a state seeking to join the democratic
circle to structure its government on a normative and institu-
tional framework that provides for the welfare of the people.
1. Historical Perspective
History has portrayed the evolution of people from a natu-
ral, unorganized state to an organized civil society as being
motivated by the necessity for collective security of both life
and property.0 6 In the 18th century, Immanuel Kant ob-
105. Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21(3).
106. Even classical liberal thought, which professes to be averse to
communitarianism, is paradoxically embedded in the logic of collectivism-the pub-
lic good of the society. The social contractarians, notwithstanding their many dif-
ferences, all recognized that from the inception of civil society, central authority
has been a functional mechanism for the individual benefit of each and every
member of society. John Locke theorized the central mechanism as follows: "Their
power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It
is a power that has no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a
right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects." LOCKE, supra
note 7, at 160; see also JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49
(Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762). Hobbes believed the very
viability of a contract was dubious absent a central authority. As Hobbes put it:
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe present-
ly, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a
condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reason-
able suspicion, it is Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over
them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is
not Voyd.
HOBBES, supra note 18, at 196.
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served the position of trust occupied by the institution of gov-
ernment and that position's connection with both internal and
international peace which, according to Kant, must be rooted
in a domestic institutional guarantee of human rights and
social welfare."7 Historical evidence shows that the reason
for the dislodgement of the feudal system-which, in turn, dis-
persed political and economic powers among secular rulers, the
church, and the feudal lords-was that a unification of powers
of all three of those institutions in a unified national state was
the best mechanism for furthering the interest of each individ-
ual institution.' ° In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia marked
the birth of the modern state, which-though it was intended
to effect total unity and progress of all individuals-has pro-
gressively vindicated Machiavelli's prediction 9 that the state
would ultimately metamorphose into an entirely self-sufficing
and non-moral entity.10 The state is a unique sphere of hu-
man development, a functional instrument that, in isolation,
has no inherent morality. The modern state, whether seen as a
product of consensus, conflict or contrivance, evolved and was
nurtured by people's search for security and social justice. Its
moral justification should be measured by the extent to which
it enhances the security and social welfare of its citizens. In
other words, the primary purpose of the modern state should,
as a basic norm, condition its functional framework, and this
should necessarily translate into normative philosophy and
material institutions.
2. Within the Framework of the Charter,
By Necessary Implication
[T]he U.N. Charter established an instrument for interna-
tional cooperation[,] ... an organism capable of life and
growth... depending not simply on the written injunctions
of the founding fathers but on the visions and wisdom of
107. See Immanuel Kant, On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political
Right, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 73, 74.
108. See WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 85-87
(1979).
109. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (George Bull ed., Penguin Books,
1961) (1513).
110. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 5-6 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
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succeeding generations."'
The doctrine of necessity, which was applied in the Ex-
penses Case," has been the basis of much of U.N. activity
falling outside the parameters of the Charter. The doctrine is
perhaps at the root of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of
195011 and of the concepts of peacekeeping and humanitari-
an intervention. An authentic statement of the boundaries of
"necessity" was set forth by Chief Justice John Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution [in this case, the Charter],
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapt-
ed to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution [the Charter]" are
legitimate."'
111. BENJAMIN V. COHEN, THE UNITED NATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
AENs, GROWTH, AND POSSBILMIES 2 (1961).
112. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20). In this
case, the court was faced with the difficult issue of the constitutional basis for the
use of armed forces in the United Nations Emergency Force Operations in the
Middle East (UNEF) and the United Nations operations in the Congo. The I.C.J.,
pursuing a policy of institutional effectiveness, decided that any action adjudged
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations
is presumed within the powers of the organization. See id. at 168; see also Inter-
national Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 136 (July 11) (court's adviso-
ry opinion on the international status of South-West Africa rested on the assump-
tion of the necessity of international supervision); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
1949 LC.J. 171, 183-85 (Apr. 9) (relying on the necessity of interpreting the legal
personality of the U.N. as an objective international personality capable of bring-
ing international claims against even non-signatories to the Charter).
113. G.A. Res. 377A, supra note 4 (adopted by a vote of 52-5 on November 3,
1950); S.C. Res. 119, U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., 751st mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/3721
(1956) (pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, Security Council's observation
of "lack of unanimity" of permanent members necessitated an emergency special
session of the General Assembly to make recommendations concerning the Suez
Canal crisis); S.C. Res. 120, U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., 754th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/3733 (1956) (necessity for emergency special session of the General Assembly to
make recommendations concerning the Soviet suppression of "the efforts of the
Hungarian people to reassert their rights"); S.C. Res. 129, U.N. SCOR, 13th Sess.,
838th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/4083 (1958) (necessity for emergency special session
of the General Assembly to make recommendations concerning complaints by Leba-
non and Jordan of interference by the United Arab Republic in their domestic af-
fairs); S.C. Res. 157, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 906th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/4526,
(1960) (necessity for emergency special session of the General Assembly to make
recommendations concerning presence of Belgian troops in the Republic of the
Congo).
114. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). To constitute
a "necessity in the eyes of [international] law," the measure must be inherent in
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A preliminary question arises: what are the ends of the
Charter and who are the intended beneficiaries? Undoubtedly,
states are the major actors in the U.N. system, but the interest
of the people remains an overriding consideration. The opening
phrase of the Charter, "We the peoples of the United Na-
tions,""5 clearly places government and states in a position of
trust."' The ends for which the United Nations was estab-
lished, as stated in the Preamble, are to forestall another
world war; to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity, worth and equality of all human beings; to estab-
lish favorable conditions for justice and respect for the rule of
international law; and "to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom.""1 Article 55 of the Char-
ter identifies the well-being of the people as a necessary con-
dition for peace,"' while the primary function and purpose of
the U.N. under article 1 of the Charter is the maintenance of
the U.N. system as it was originally conceived, and not merely because it is desir-
able. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 47, para.
89 (July 18).
115. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
116. See Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples),
in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 17, 25 (James Crawford ed., 1988); see also W. Mi-
chael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78
AM. J. INTL L. 642, 643-44 (1984).
117. U.N. CHARTER preamble (emphasis added). Article 31 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty (to which judicial class the
Charter belongs) shall be interpreted "in the light of its object and purpose." Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Article 31 classifies the preamble as
part of the "context for purposes of interpretation," id. art. 31(2), and endorses a
consideration of subsequent state practice, id. art. 31(3)(b). Hence, the Charter
should be interpreted in the context of its preamble, and in the light of its stated
objects, purposes, and contemporary state practice.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Article 55 reads in full:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions
of economic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and relat-
ed problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion.
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international peace and security."9 These are legally binding
international agreements that expressly stipulate certain obli-
gations of a state to its citizens and the role of the United
Nations in overseeing their implementation. Under article 56
each state accepts to take separate action for the achievement
of the provisions of article 55. A literary interpretation of arti-
cles 55 and 56 imposes a legal obligation on the state and
creates a populist responsibility for the United Nations. Any
construction of state responsibility in this respect as lacking
immediate obligation as a result of the United Nations' "pro-
motional" role is bound to fail as it contradicts the letter and
spirit of article 56. However, whatever interpretation is
adopted should be contextualized. Within a socio-economic
framework (where issues of social well-being are often dis-
placed by the materialism of political power in most societies,
and by individualism and liberal legalism in others), the exter-
nalization of social well-being from the reality of political pow-
er undermines any meaningful promotional activity. There
must be a normative institutional framework providing empir-
ical benchmarks for the evaluation of state performance, and
also providing the leverage for internal enforcement.120 More-
over, poverty is often rooted in the structure of a society. Thus,
to be effective, any solution must be materially and normative-
ly structural. If peace and social well-being are inseparable
partners, then, in light of the duty assumed by states under
article 56, the right to democracy necessarily envisions a
119. Id. art. 1(1).
120. Commenting on the promotional activity of the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Asbjorn Eide observed that difficulties
arose, inter alia, from the fact that within the state "the obligations-and neglect
of them-are very difficult to pinpoint." Asbjern Eide, Realization of Social and
Economic Rights: The Minimum Threshold Approach, INTL CO M i'N JURISTS, Dec.
1989, at 40, 41.
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 56. Article 56 of the Charter states: "All Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Orga-
nization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. The duty
of states to take effective action to create reasonable living standards for their
citizens under article 56 was reiterated by the General Assembly in a resolution of
December 12, 1958. See International Co-operation for Economic Development of
Under-developed Countries, G.A. Res. 1316, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Agenda Item
28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1316 (1958); see also Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, G-A. Res. 2158, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Agenda Item 45, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2158 (1966); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res.
3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 2319th plen. mtg. at 50, U.N. Doc.
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democratic system possessing the normative-that is, constitu-
tional-and institutional guarantees of the people's social well-
being.2
3. Within the Framework of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration spells out civil, political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights of all beings. Specifically, the
Universal Declaration provides, inter alia, for the right to
democratic governance, 2 ' social security,124  employ-
ment, 5 adequate standard of living, food, clothing, housing
and medical care,2  education, 2 7  and cultural develop-
ment.m Article 28 states that "[e]veryone is entitled to a so-
A/9631 (1975); Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, 97th plen. mtg. at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987).
122. An African elder statesman once observed:
What rights has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from
the soil provided rains do not fail. His children work at his side without
schooling, medical care or even good feeding. Certainly he has freedom to
vote and speak as he wishes. But these freedoms are much less real to
him than his freedom to be exploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will
his existing political freedom become properly meaningful and his right to
human dignity a fact.
Amos Wako, The Rule of Law: Cornerstone of Economic Progress, 23 INTL BUS.
LAW. 350, 353 (1995).
123. Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21(3).
124. Id. art. 22. Article 22 states:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-opera-
tion and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State,
of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity
and the free development of his personality.
125. Id. art. 23(1). Article 23(1): "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice
of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment."
126. Id. art. 25(1). Article 25(1):
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, hous-
ing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to secu-
rity in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old
age or lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
127. Id. art. 26(1). Article 26(1):
Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the
basis of merit.
128. Id. art. 27. Article 27(1): "Everyone has the right freely to participate in
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cial and international order in which the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." 9 It is
clear from the integrative language of the preamble and article
28 that each article is to be interpreted in the context of the
Universal Declaration and not in isolation. Thus, article 21
means a right to a democratic system that guarantees the
rights set out in articles 22 to 27, as required by article 28. In
short, articles 21 and 28 together define a democratic state in
international law as one that possesses the requisite substan-
tive content, procedural content, and structural content (i.e., a
constitutional and institutional framework guaranteeing every
individual the rights set forth in articles 22 through 27).'
4. Endorsement by United Nations Operations
More than 200 years after Immanuel Kant, the United
Nations has programmatically endorsed his Republic. Indeed,
"[Kant's] insight.., anticipates and grounds Article 28 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.... "1 1 The new em-
phasis on peace-building and development 112 is evidence of
such endorsement, and the U.N. commitment to social progress
was endorsed by 117 world leaders at the 1975 World Summit
for Social Development.' 3 The U.N. organizes and funds nu-
merous conferences for critical assessment of national perfor-
mance in the area of democracy, and takes positive steps to
assist the uplifting of the welfare of peoples. The United Na-
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific ad-
vancement and its benefits.'
129. Id. art. 28..
130. See John P. Humphrey, The Just Requirements of Morality, Public Order
and the General Welfare in a Democratic Society, in THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM
137, 147 (R. St. J. MacDonald & John P. Humphrey eds., 1979). Humphrey ob-
serves that "the General Assembly... meant by democratic society the kind of
society in which the rights enunciated by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights are recognized and respected." Id.
131. Marilyn McMorrow, Global Poverty, Subsistence Rights, and Consequent
Obligations for Rich and Poor States, in AFRICA, HUMAN RiGHTS, AND THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 37,
40 (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et al. eds., 1994).
132. See BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, BUILDING PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT at 1,
UN. Sales No. E.95.I.3 (1994). The former Secretary-General noted that economic
and social questions have long occupied the major part of U.N. efforts, and that
the U.N. is "deepening its attention to the foundations of peace." Id.
133. See THE UNITED NATIONS AT 50: NOTES FOR SPEAKERS, supra note 51, at
32.
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tions Children's Fund; Development Program; Population
Fund; World Food Program; Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion; Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization; Indus-
trial Development Organization; and Environment Program
are all material evidence of such positive steps." But beyond
this, it is significant that while the U.N. budget does not nor-
mally exceed $3 billion, 5 the U.N. and the World Bank to-
gether disburse more than $30 billion on social and develop-
ment programs ranging from irrigation systems to primary
health and education networks.3 6 The foregoing is itself an
acknowledgement that every state (whether democratic or not)
has an obligation of minimum welfare for its people.
However, the attainment of democratic status is different
from its sustenance. In 1793-94, revolutionary France had a
democratically elected government which succeeded in estab-
lishing and maintaining a state of bloody terror. And in the
recent past, Panama, Grenada, and the Philippines have
shown that the reinstatement of a democratically elected gov-
ernment is not necessarily an assurance of the emergence of a
virile democracy. With the hindsight of fledgling democracies,
the next and concluding sections seek to demonstrate that
democracy has an internal morality that strengthens or weak-
ens its structure and its functional harmony.
V. THE INTERNAL MORALITY OF DEMOCRACY
The political ethic of a people is a product of the history
and traditions of that people. It operates as a political instinct,
informing and guiding political decisions, political relations,
and political institutions. In the practical arena of politics, the
personality of individuals and their acceptability for leadership
are always preliminarily screened by this ethic and based on a
wide range of cultural and traditional indices. For example; in
most traditional African societies the public image of an indi-
134. See generally id.
135. See, e.g., Programme Budget for the Biennium 1996-97, G.A. Res. 215,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 116, 100th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
AJRES/50/215 (1996) (appropriating $2,608,274,000 for U.N. budget); Programme
Budget for the Biennium 1994-95, G.. Res. 220, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda
Item 107, 95th plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/220 (1995) (appropriating
$2,608,274,400 for U.N. budget).
136. See id. at 34.
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vidual is a reflection of the individual's ancestral antecedents.
Evidence of some sacrilege or apostasy is an unspoken disqual-
ification from public office; this disqualification may be re-
versed only by exceptional personal integrity and accom-
plishment. The political ethic could, in some cases, effectively
perform the role of the unseen gatekeeper, filtering out the
"unsuitable" from participating in leadership, thereby refining
the quality of governance. It could constitute either an internal
weakness or a pillar of strength of a democracy; for example,
the mysticization of political leadership in some places is one
surviving ethic that has consistently impeded the development
of democracy. In some cases, the consequence of an extreme
negative political ethic is a self-destructive democracy.
Algeria's experience is instructive."7 The importance of a
people's democratic culture to the functioning of a democratic
system was confirmed by the Report of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation (CSCE) Seminar of Experts on Demo-
cratic Institutions made to the CSCE Council in Oslo in
1991.138
Often, a combination of external factors such as corrup-
tion, patrimonialism, and clientelism worsen an inherently
weak democracy. In Haiti, for example, corrupt elected repre-
sentatives conspired with the judiciary and the military to
subvert the popular mandate of the people. In Nigeria, in the
wake of the annulment of the June 1993 elections, corrupt
137. The 1991 election in Algeria was won by the Islamic Salvation Front
(F.I.S.), but the election results were annulled by the military after the party
declared its intention to uproot all democratic institutions and cancel periodic
elections in order to enthrone the rule of Islam. See Human Rights in Algeria
Since the Halt of the Electoral Process, 4 MIDDLE EAST WATcH, Feb. 1992, at 4-5.
However, it is submitted that the publicly declared intent of the F.I.S. to
destroy democracy, which was the basis of its mandate, was a repudiation of the
authority of its mandate. Since it would have been illegal for the F.I.S. to assume
office without a mandate, the military intervention may be justified on grounds of
a threat to national security. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant De-
mocracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 6-9 (1995) (discussing the Algerian question).
138. See Thornberry, supra note 38, at 102 n.2. Part I of the Report stated
that a
democratic culture was a necessary element for the functioning of all
democratic governments, and required permanent encouragement. Where
a democratic tradition of long duration has not had the chance to devel-
op, or had been interrupted, it would be necessary to develop a demo-
cratic culture, on the local, regional and national level, in order to sus-
tain new democratic institutions.
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elected representatives betrayed their constituencies as they
voted for the continuance of military dictatorship. In the Zair-
ian "Kleptocracy," Mobutu Sesesoku amassed $6 billion as
personal wealth,"9 whereas the 1994 per capita income of
Zaire was barely $154 per annum.'4a The genocide that oc-
curred in Rwanda, and is currently threatening Burundi, was
partly due to non-representative and oppressive leadership.''
There is force in the argument that the intractable problems of
internal crisis and the oppression of minorities and indigenous
peoples would be greatly reduced if the democratic audit is
strengthened. The frightening consequences of criminal leader-
ship and the challenge to international lawyers has been lucid-
ly laid out by Stanley Hoffman as follows:
[Wie face a world in which many States are "failed States," in
a situation of chaos, anarchy or permanent strife, either be-
cause of disintegration along ethnic or religious lines, or
because of the flimsiness and corruption of their institutions,
or because of the artificiality both of their borders (arbitrarily
traced by colonial rulers) and of the Western-based notion of
the State when it is imposed on parts of Africa and Asia....
Both [Professor, and now Justice] Higgins and [Professor]
Koskenniemi point out that the UN is simply not equipped to
deal with collapsing States or with rulers who systematically
violate human rights, and that "social transformation for the
better might sometimes necessitate revolution."'42
Perhaps disintegration of states can be reduced. Perhaps vio-
lent revolutions can be avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Redefining Democracy
This paper has attempted to situate the universal democ-
racy within a universal heritage and away from any particular
political model. It has used empirical data, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, and international and regional in-
139. See Why Bankroll Africa's Ceausescu?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1990, at A22.
140. See 2 EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1996, at 3613 (1996).
141. See DIXON KAMUKAMA, RWANDA CONFLICT- ITS ROOTS AND REGIONAL IM-
PLICATIONS 20-24 (1993).
142. Stanley Hoffman, Thoughts on the UIN at Fifty, 6 EUR. J. INTL L. 317,
324 (1995).
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struments to buttress the normative character and institution-
al/structural requirements of the universal democracy. It ended
the inquiry by throwing some light into the internal aspects of
democracy, its configuration by historical and cultural norms,
values, and even myths. As a result, it has shown that an
inherently undemocratic political culture germinates institu-
tions that are easily appropriated to mask exploitation, illu-
sion, or corruption. Given these asymmetries that surround the
development of democracy (for the benefit of hindsight, the
discussion on the internal morality of democracy showed how
political integration of civil society often has to contend with
centrifugal socio-cultural factors), the project of democratic
peace should not be left to the fortunes of a slow and uncertain
voyage of domestic political change. The human and material
cost of unassisted change emphasize the immediate necessity
for a positive multilateral measure. Such a measure must
consist of a step towards realigning the dominant institutional
definition of democracy to the supreme political power of civil
society. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to conceptu-
alize democracy in terms of human development. This calls for
democracy's redefinition in the language and material of hu-
man welfare. This measure will serve as the foundation for
building a democratic solidarity for a civil society that feels
empowered to demand accountability from public institutions,
to confront totalitarian governments, and, if necessary, to bear
any sacrifice for democracy.
Second, as the discussion on the internal and external
problems of democracy shows, tensions inherent in pluralism
are visible in many societies. These tensions are not necessari-
ly accommodated by the majoritarian ethos of democracy which
undergirds all spheres of participation. It is thus time to fortify
the participation index of international instruments and recon-
ciliatory devices of domestic institutions. This can be done by
internationally criminalizing political oppression of minorities
and the looting of public resources. This step promises the
additional benefit of reassuring minorities, and ensuring that
democratic institutions and devices for reconciling competing
claims that flow from diversity are not undermined by corrupt
and inept leadership. It is yet another building block to the
needed and attainable consensus of democratic commitment in
lieu of consensus of opinion. Again, the statist version of legiti-
macy grounded on the logic of "defactoism" or effectiveness
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ought to be abandoned as it has masked the worst violations of
civil and political rights. Legitimacy of any government should
be a function of the aggregate perception of civil society. One
way of materializing the populist expression of legitimacy is by
neutralizing the capacity of any government to masquerade
dictatorships as popular and accepted by the masses. With
particular focus on democracy, the process by which civil soci-
ety votes a government in or out (often the ultimate expression
of popular sovereignty) presents a veritable means of realign-
ing legitimacy to popular sovereignty. U.N. democratic activi-
ties around the world support the view that the participation
of a neutral, disinterested observer is one means of protecting
the sanctity of elections. Needless to say, such a principle of
external involvement should be multilateral and of general
application so that every state's sovereignty is equally affected.
B. A Role for International Law
In recent times the most authentic and stimulating intel-
lectual effort to rediscover popular sovereignty and to subject
political power to popular control is the work of the German
philosopher Jiirgen Habermas." The major attraction of
Habermas' work is that it demonstrates the capacity of positive
law as an instrument of integration, and the building blocks of
solidarity.' The challenge to international law is to
143. See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBU-
TIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.,
MIT Press 1996) (1992). His theory of deliberative politics is an attempt to locate
within the modem institutions of democracy a superior norm of deliberative public
opinion. Id. at 274-75. Proceeding on the assumption of the existence of unavoid-
able factual complexities that make the ideals of uncoerced agreement and undis-
torted communication difficult to achieve, his theory offers a model that would
overcome the tension between the "facts" of social complexities and the ideal
"norms" of democracy. Id. at 430-36. The model emphasizes the use of law as an
integrative instrument in guaranteeing a discursive lawmaking process in which
all citizens reach an agreement. Furthermore, the model encourages open delibera-
tions in both parliaments/congresses and in decisionmaking institutions, institutions
in which all citizens can participate. See id. at 162-68. Habermas's stated objective
is the transformation of "Communicative Power" into "Administrative Power." See
id. at 187-88. In order to achieve this he seeks a new concept of normative legiti-
macy: "[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent
(zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has
been legally constituted." Id. at 110.
144. Despite its logical appeal, the theory chooses a standard of democracy that
is not practicable: consensus. See id. at 61. The theory therefore leaves many ques-
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strengthen the internal morality of democracy by rediscovering
popular sovereignty. Hence, international law must inject con-
fidence and legitimacy to the electoral process by an institu-
tionalized neutral observatory process, which should be appli-
cable to all states without exception. Further, international
law needs to serve as a deterrent to anti-democratic agents
and to regulate the quality of representation in governments
by clearly defining violations of a democratic mandate, in
whatever form, as an international crime against the peace.
International law needs to create a rallying point of solidarity
for all citizens by fostering a sense of commitment and confi-
dence in democracy. To accomplish this goal, however, the
international legal regime must solidify its own view of democ-
racy. When there is finally a clear-eyed view of democracy
within the instruments of international law, the journey to-
wards global peace and security may finally begin in earnest.
tions unanswered, in particular: 1) How can consensus be attained in an acknowl-
edged context of diversity and pluralism?; 2) How practicable is it to create a
forum or, indeed, multiple fora for all individuals to reach a consensus on multiple
issues of governance?; 3) What is the basis for attributing requisite knowledge to
all citizens, or is manipulation not more potent in uninformed participation?; and
4) Is mob governance not a real possibility in the model?
It is submitted that the very essence of democracy is the compromise be-
tween consensus and the pluralism-majoritarian principle. Indeed, if there were no
differences in opinion there would be no need for democracyl In effect, a theory
that seeks consensus can only be seeking an alternative to democracy.
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THE CONVENTION ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to achieve international peace and security in
accordance with the United Nations Charter;
Recognizing the need to ensure that States which are not sig-
natories to this Convention act in accordance with its provi-
sions and principles so far as may be necessary for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security;
Reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person;
Realizing that social and economic development of peoples
founded on stable democratic systems of governance are the
foundations of international peace and security;
Recognizing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
the normative standard of a democratic system;
Convinced that though democracy is susceptible to a people's
culture and social economic reality, it has a core unalterable
content as a result of a global cultural heritage which has been
codified in Articles 21 to 28 of the Universal Declaration;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
(1) All human beings have a right to democratic governance
which shall consist of:
(a) a political system based on the free will of the people
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be by secret vote
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or by equivalent free voting procedures.
(b) a political system based on constitutional guarantees
and institutional framework for the realization of the fun-
damental human rights and the rights to work, food, cloth-
ing, housing, medicare, unemployment, security and edu-
cation.
(c) These rights shall be justiciable and enforceable by
individual or group legal action in each State.
(2) It shall be the primary duty of every State to channel a
substantial part of its resources into providing opportunities
for the enjoyment of these rights, and an equivalent reduction
in its defense budget. Therefore, the budget and expenditures
of member States shall give priority to the realization of these
rights.
(3) Member States agreeing that the national budget, and any
other empirical measures and projects in their territories, shall
constitute the indices for compliance assessment, hereby agree
to the monitoring of the implementation of these rights by any
organ chosen by the United Nations.
(4) All member States hereby accept international monitoring
as a requisite part of the electoral process. The international
monitoring team shall be made up of Non-Governmental Orga-
nizations accredited to the United Nations, and United Nations
experts. The monitoring shall be carried out under the auspic-
es of the United Nations.
(5) This article provides for the minimum of a democratic sys-
tem and is without prejudice to any international instrument
or national legislation which confers wider benefits on peoples
in any material particular.
ARTICLE 2
(1) The democratic character of every State shall be unalter-
able, and no exceptional circumstance other than a state of
war shall justify its modification in any form.
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(2) Each State shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial, or other measures to protect the democratic character
of the political system as provided in Article 1.
(3) From the commencement of this convention no State party
shall recognize any government that comes to power by an
undemocratic means. The duty of non-recognition shall include
a duty to refrain from any acts, dealings, diplomatic relation-
ships, or any contacts which could imply a recognition of the
legitimacy of the Government.
(4) By virtue of this Article, all States have the right and the
duty to take collective measures to protect the democratic char-
acter of any State, provided such action is taken under the
aegis of the United Nations and in accordance with its Char-
ter.
(5) The duties of non-recognition and collective protection
above shall be enforced simultaneously and in such a manner
as not to inflict unintended hardship on the general public of
the target State.
ARTICLE 3
(1) Each State shall ensure that all acts of overthrowing a
democratic government by force of arms or threat of same or
otherwise taking control of government by any other means
not democratic within Article 1 herein are offenses under its
criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to take over
control of government in like manner and to an act by any
person which constitutes complicity or participation by mem-
bership in the executive body of an undemocratic government.
(2) Each State, taking into account the grave nature of these
offenses and their consequences, shall make provision for ap-
propriate penalties which must not be less than 5 years im-
prisonment without option of fine.
ARTICLE 4
(1) Each State shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial, or other measures to enforce the accountability and
responsiveness of the government to the people, and the inde-
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pendence of the judiciary.
(2) Each State shall ensure that all acts of official corruption
are offenses under its criminal laws.
(3) Each State party shall provide a penalty for the offense of
official corruption not less than five years imprisonment with-
out option of fine.
(4) For the purposes of this Convention the term "Official Cor-
ruption" means any act by a member of the executive council of
any government which amounts to an illegal enrichment of
himself or other person(s) or group, or an abuse of public office
for an unwarranted purpose which threatens or affects the
democratic character of the State, and includes any misuse of
official position for suppression or oppression of a minority or
indigenous group.
ARTICLE 5
(1) The penalty for a conviction under Articles 3 and 4 shall
include a forfeiture of all properties acquired by the accused
during the commission of the offense, and any other property
unlawfully acquired in connection with the commission of the
offense to the benefit of any person whatsoever.
(2) Articles 3 and 4 are without prejudice to any international
instrument or national legislation which does or may contain
provisions of wider application.
ARTICLE 6
(1) Upon a formal notification of a criminal charge before a
competent court of law by a democratic government accompa-
nied with a copy of the charge sheet and proof of evidence, any
State in whose territory a person alleged to have committed
any offense of same nature as those referred to in Articles 3
and 4 shall take the individual into custody or take legal mea-
sures to ensure his or her presence, and shall take the interim
measure of holding as disputed all his or her assets within its
jurisdiction.
(2) Such a State shall immediately make a preliminary judicial
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inquiry into the existence of a prima facie case based on the
proof of evidence.
(3) Upon being satisfied with the evidence it shall extradite the
alleged offender to the State of nationality pursuant to Article
7, otherwise it shall assume jurisdiction over the offenses and
shall, on notifying the State of nationality, request for full re-
cord of evidence which shall be promptly dispatched.
(4) This Convention is without prejudice to the right of the
alleged offender to a fair trial.
ARTICLE 7
(1) Every State shall deem offenses of the same nature as
those in Articles 3 and 4 as extraditable offenses based on this
Convention.
(2) The conditions for extradition under this Convention shall
be:
(a) That the requesting government is democratic;
(b) That the proof of evidence disclose prima facie the
commission of the act alleged by the alleged offender, or
any circumstance linking the alleged offender with the act
or its consequence.
ARTICLE 8
(1) Every State shall, upon reasonable notice of the criminal
charge against the alleged offender, take effective measures to
preserve the property in all the assets of the offender within
its jurisdiction as "disputed property" for duration of trial.
(2) Each State shall to the extent possible enforce within its
jurisdiction the judgment of a trial under this Convention and
shall take measures to transfer legal ownership of properties
forfeited under the trial law and by virtue of this convention to
the State of nationality.
(3) The State of nationality shall be responsible for the expens-
es of member States incurred in the extradition, prosecution of
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the offender, or execution of the judgment or implementation of
any part of this Convention; and shall be solely liable for all
actions, claims, and damages arising from the implementation
of this Convention.
ARTICLE 9
(1) The International Court of Justice is hereby given the juris-
diction to review any decision or action taken pursuant to this
Convention, on the application of the alleged offender, in any
of the following cases:
(a) Where there is convincing evidence that the alleged
offender was a victim of persecution by the government of
his or her country; or
(b) Where there is a substantial miscarriage of justice in
the trial.
(2) The court shall determine its jurisdiction to review based
on the application of the alleged offender.
(3) The structure and procedure of the court for the proceed-
ings shall be determined by the court in accordance with its
statute.
(4) The decision of the court shall be binding.
534 [Vol. XXII:3
